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AUTO MANUFACTURERS AND HIGH SPEEDS: IS
A FAST CAR A DEFECTIVE PRODUCT?
Stephen H. Legomsky*
INTRODUCTION
In 1975, more than 45,000 Americans lost their lives in
traffic accidents.' Another 1.8 million people suffered disabling
injury.2 Automobiles consume over 100 billion gallons of pre-
cious fuel resources each year," and it is well known that car
exhaust is a significant source of air pollution.' It is therefore
apparent that in many ways the automobile poses serious na-
tional problems. As will be seen, these varying problems share
a common characteristic: each one becomes more pronounced
with an increase in vehicle speed.5
Without question, an innocent person whose injury is prox-
imately caused by a speeding automobile should be able to
recover damages from the driver. However, it is frequently
overlooked that speeding could not have occurred but for the
manufacturer's conscious decision to design a car capable of
high speeds. It is the thesis of this article that such a manufac-
turer is equally culpable. When it designs a car with a capacity
for excessive speed, it should therefore be liable for injuries
proximately caused by the resulting speeding.
A cautionary note should be made. Throughout this article
the term "excessive" is used to describe the speed capacity
beyond which liability for an accident resulting from speeding
would attach to the manufacturer. No attempt is made to de-
termine the specific speed which should be considered
"excessive." Once it is agreed that speed capacity beyond some
point should give rise to manufacturer liability, the location of
that point would presumably reflect existing maximum posted
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1. See Recht & Carraro, Lowest Death Rate Ever, TRAFFIC SAFETr, March, 1976,
at 14, 15.
2. Id.
3. American Auto. Ass'n, Questions & Answers on Energy and the Automobile 1
(Jan. 15, 1975) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
4. See generally Cal. Air Resources Bd., Project M-220, Effect of Speed on Emis-
sions (Mar., 1971).
5. See discussions on Traffic Accidents and Fatalities, Energy Consumption, and
Air Pollution infra.
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speed limits, reasonable predictions as to future changes in
those limits, safety data, energy consumption, and other rele-
vant factors. Although the current maximum speed limit in the
United States is fifty-five miles per hour,' the assumption is
made here that the point at which excessive speed should result
in liability may be higher than that limit to provide leeway for
future changes.
This article begins by exploring the question whether the
courts should impose common law liability on the manufac-
turer of a car capable of excessive speed, in cases where a
person driving the car at such a speed thereby causes injury to
a third party. Subsequent sections of the article build on the
substantive principles advanced in the common law discussion
by suggesting two alternative ways in which manufacturer lia-
bility could be imposed: an act of Congress, and federal admin-
istrative regulation.
IMPOSITION OF COMMON LAW LIABILITY BY THE COURTS
Of all the legal theories advanced in products liability
cases generally, negligence and strict liability carry special
promise in attaching liability to the manufacturer of a speeding
automobile.7 Under either theory of liability, the legal argu-
ments and factual data will be shown to be sufficient to submit
the case to the jury for a determination of liability.
Negligence
A manufacturer's liability in negligence requires a breach
of duty proximately causing damage to the interests of an-
other.' At least since Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,I it has been
evident that the elements of duty and proximate cause are
closely related. Palsgraf illustrated that issues relevant to both
elements are often resolved by reference to the foreseeability of
6. Act of Jan. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046 (temporary legislation);
23 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. V 1975) (permanent legislation).
7. For a summary of the possible causes of action in products liability cases, see
D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY CASES AND MATERIALS 35-97 (1976). See, e.g.,
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) (express warranty);
McCabe v. L.K. Liggett Drug Co., 330 Mass. 177, 112 N.E.2d 254 (1953) (implied
warranty of merchantability); Northern Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Gates, 196 N.W.2d
70 (N.D. 1972) (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose); Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (negligence); Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)
(strict liability in tort).
8. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 143-44 (4th ed. 1971).
9. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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a particular occurrence. The applicability of that relationship
to the liability question analyzed in this article will be closely
examined.
A. Duty and Proximate Cause: Must the Manufacturer
Anticipate Speeding?
The nature of the duty a person owes to others is typically
articulated in terms of the standard of care, the determination
of that standard being a question of law.'" A manufacturer, in
particular, has a duty to exercise reasonable care in designing
his product." It is contended here that a car has been unreason-
ably designed when it is capable of being driven at an excessive
speed.
To say the appropriate standard is that of reasonable care,
however, does not fully define the duty. Two further problems
arise. The first concerns the class of risks against which the
manufacturer is expected to guard-more specifically, which
uses must be anticipated. The second problem is whether the
duty of reasonable care is owed to an innocent bystander.
The class of risks problem was the major stumbling block
in Schemel v. General Motors Corp., '2 apparently the only case
in which the argument has been made that a car capable of
excessive speed has been unreasonably designed. In that case
a Chevrolet Impala driven at a speed of 115 miles per hour:'
collided with the plaintiff's car, causing him personal injury.
The plaintiff sued General Motors, the manufacturer of the
speeding car, on the theory it had been negligent in designing
a vehicle capable of such speed. The Seventh Circuit, applying
Indiana law," upheld the trial court's dismissal of the claim,
ruling that as a matter of law a manufacturer need not make
his product safe for an unintended use.' 5 The unintended use
issue can be analyzed in terms of duty, abnormal use, or proxi-
mate cause. As the following discussion will show, the Schemel
10. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Evans v.
General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
11. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Sills v. Massey-
Ferguson, 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d
465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
12. 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
13. Id. at 803.
14. When federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the court must
apply the substantive law of the state in which it is situated. Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15. 384 F.2d at 804-05.
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decision does not significantly dampen the prospects for estab-
lishing the cause of action advocated in this article.
Definition of Duty. To reach its 1967 Schemel decision,"
the Seventh Circuit rejected the cause of action on the basis
that no duty had been shown. The court relied on its 1966
decision in Evans v. General Motors Corp.," also based on
Indiana law. In Evans, the driver of a General Motors car had
been killed in a collision with another vehicle. The decedent's
widow sued General Motors on a negligence theory, alleging the
design of the car had failed to provide sufficient protection in
the event of an accident. The Evans court held that the manu-
facturer's only duty in designing a product is to make it reason-
ably safe for its intended uses,'" and that a collision is not an
intended use.
In line with the overwhelming trend in the crashworthiness
cases, however, a majority of jurisdictions have now rejected
Evans in favor of the rule of Larsen v. General Motors Corp. '8
In Larsen the Eighth Circuit held the manufacturer has a duty
to anticipate all reasonably forseeable uses of the car, regard-
less of whether such uses were intended. Because traffic acci-
dents are foreseeable, the court recognized a duty to make the
car "crashworthy," that is, reasonably safe in the event of acci-
dent. Though many decisions deny manufacturer liability after
finding that the danger posed by the alleged defect was not
unreasonable, 0 such holdings must be distinguished from the
Evans rule that the manufacturer has no duty to anticipate a
collision. Not surprisingly, Evans has been severely criticized
16. Id. at 802.
17. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966); see 384 F.2d at 804.
18. 359 F.2d at 825. Several other jurisdictions have followed Evans. See, e.g.,
McLung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 240
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270
F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex.
1967); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
19. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d
173 (1st Cir. 1974) (strict liability); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551
P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976) (strict liability); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8
Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (defect was in manufacture rather
than in design); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737
(1974) (negligence); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d
268 (1973) (strict liability); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969)
(negligence); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973) (strict liabil-
ity); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975) (both negligence and
strict liability).
20. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (neg-
ligence); Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973); Friedrich v. Anderson, 191




To be sure, recent crashworthiness cases applying Indiana
law have applied the unintended use analysis of Evans. 2 None-
theless, several other post-Evans developments suggest a grad-
ual erosion of that doctrine. In Sills v. Massey-Ferguson,':' a
federal case from the Northern District of Indiana, a lawn-
mower being towed by a truck picked up a bolt from the
ground, hurling it through the air and injuring an unrelated
bystander. The federal district court was bound to apply Indi-
ana law. If it had wished to follow Evans, the court could have
said that picking up bolts while being towed was an unintended
use against which the lawnmower manufacturer need not
guard. Instead, recovery was permitted. Arguably the decision
indicates a judicial reticence to apply Evans outside the narrow
context of the crashworthiness issue.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit itself rejected Evans when
applying Illinois law in Nanda v. Ford Motor Co.2" There the
court held the automobile manufacturer liable for injuries sus-
tained by an occupant when the defective positioning of the
fuel tank caused a fire upon collision.
Moreover, a general climate of hostility may dissuade
courts from extending. Evans beyond the issue of crashworthi-
ness. For example, where the alleged defect is the capacity for
excessive speed, rather than the failure to make the car crash-
worthy, a court may be willing to distinguish Evans. Such a
distinction is quite possible. The failure to make a car crash-
worthy merely increases the chance of injury in the event of an
accident, while the capacity for excessive speed actually in-
creases the chance of the accident occuring in the first place," '
an arguably higher level of foreseeability. 5
Finally, it was not until 1970 that Indiana first adopted the
doctrine of strict liability.27 Arguably, the Evans court, basing
21. See, e.g., 80 HAwv. L. REv. 688 (1967); 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 311 (1966); 42
NOTRE DAME LAW. 111 (1966).
22. Latimer v. General Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1976); Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 418 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Ind. 1976).
23. 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
24. 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974).
25. See notes 64-117 and accompanying text infra.
26. Speeding also increases the severity of those accidents that do occur. See
notes 85-88 and accompanying text infra.
27. Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Products, Inc., 258 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. 1970).
Liability was denied, however, on the ground that the plaintiff had assumed the risk.
Id. at 657. For discussion of the assumption of risk doctrine, see subsection entitled
Assumption of the Risk: A Defense of the Manufacturer infra.
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its decision on negligence law, would not have reached the
result it did if the case had been heard after strict liability had
been adopted by Indiana. Such a possibility seems realistic, for
the Evans opinion focused on what type of conduct should be
required of the manufacturer. Because strict liability places
less emphasis on the conduct of the defendant, such a consider-
ation might have influenced the outcome in Evans.2'
Thus the barrier created by Evans must be placed in its
proper perspective. The Evans doctrine, denying recovery for
unintended uses, does not apply at all in the majority of states.
Further, given the vehement criticism with which the case has
been received, as well as the general trend in the direction of
Larsen, the likelihood of further desertion from the Evans
camp seems great. Finally, even in those jurisdictions which
elect to retain the Evans doctrine, the hostile reception may
dissuade courts from expanding it beyond crashworthiness. In
conclusion a manufacturer should be held to have a duty to
anticipate excessive speeding.
Abnormal Use. The bar to liability which the court found
in Schemel can also be analyzed in terms of abnormal use,2 " a
defense in a products liability action."' However, abnormal use
is not truly an affirmative defense; rather, it is a finding that
the product did not contain a defect causing an injury.:" When
an injury arises from an abnormal use in a negligence case, the
action is barred because the defendant's conduct did not
proximately cause the injury.2 Thus abnormal use is not an
affirmative defense; normal use is a part of the plaintiff's
case .13
Regardless of the label, it is now apparent that a use
should be regarded as abnormal only if it is one which the
defendant cannot have been expected to anticipate. :"4 Thus the
basic test for abnormal use is whether the use was reasonably
28. See generally subsection entitled Strict Liability infra. But see Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 418 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Ind. 1976) (intended purpose test applicable to
strict liability as well as negligence).
29. See generally Comment, Abnormal Use in the Strict Products Liability
Case-The Plaintiff's Burden of Proof?, 6 Sw. U.L. REv. 661 (1974).
30. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and As-
sumption of Risk, 25 VAD. L. REv. 93, 95 (1972); Wade, Strict Tort Liability, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 846 (1973).
31. Noel, supra note 30, at 96.
32. Id. at 95; Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 431, 261 N.E.2d 305,
312 (1970).
33. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963) (strict liability).
34. See note 32 supra.
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foreseeable rather than whether it was one for which the prod-
uct was manufactured.3 5
Speeding could hardly be viewed as unforeseeable. One
author, in fact, has used speeding for the express purpose of
illustrating how an unintended use might nevertheless be fore-
seeable, pointing out, "Automobiles will surely be driven,
sometimes at high speed, and often where other vehicles and
pedestrians are present. 36 The extent to which drivers violate
speed limits is great and is well documented.3 1
Further, even the restrictive "intended use" test should
result in liability when a manufacturer consciously builds a car
capable of excessive speed. To apply that test, a legal definition
of "intent" becomes necessary. By analogy to the law of inten-
tional torts, one should be held to "intend" a particular conse-
quence when he acts either for the purpose of bringing it about
or with the knowledge to a substantial certainty that it will
occur .3 The incidence of excessive speeding" lends impetus to
the argument that a manufacturer who builds a line of' cars
capable of excessive speed knows with substantial certainty
that many of them will be driven at such speeds. Thus speeding
should be deemed an intended use since the manufacturer
knows with substantial certainty it will occur.
Proximate Cause. There is one final approach to analyzing
the Schhemel rule that a manufacturer need not anticipate
that its car will be driven at an excessive speed. The rule
amounts to a holding that speeding constitutes an intervening
act precluding a showing of proximate cause. If that was the
intention of the Schemel court, its holding was plainly erro-
neous.
Concededly, driving the car at an excessive speed amounts
to a negligent intervening act. It is clear, however, that a negli-
gent intervening act will not be a superseding act, relieving the
defendant of liability, unless the act was not reasonably fore-
35. See the crashworthiness cases discussed in text accompanying notes 16-23
supra. See also Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1976); Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235
P.2d 857 (1951); Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d
681 (1964). One case denying liability because of abnormal use is Smith v. Hobart
Manufacturing Co., 302 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1962). Even in Smith, liability was denied
only after a finding that the misuse in question was an unanticipated misuse.
36. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.6, at 1546 (1956).
37. See text accompanying notes 60-63 infra.
38. Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955); see also W. PRos-
SER, LAW OFTORTS § 8, at 32 (4th ed. 1971); SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 337 (4th ed. 1913).
39. See text accompanying notes 60-63 infra.
19791
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
seeable to the defendant."' This rule applies in Indiana, where
Schemel was decided; an independent force which was reason-
ably foreseeable does not break the chain of causation."
Nor does the criminal nature of the intervening speeding
preclude a finding of proximate cause. Many cases have im-
posed liability even when criminal conduct of a third party
intervened between the allegedly negligent act of the defendant
and the alleged injury to the plaintiff. 2 In the words of one
California court, "it is not the law that one has no duty to
protect against foreseeable criminal acts.""
The Schemel court might very well have been disturbed by
the prospect of holding a manufacturer liable in a situation
where the third party speeder had arguably been even more
culpable. The negligent act of speeding would of course provide
a basis for imposing liability on the speeder. It does not follow,
however, that it provides a basis for denying liability of the
manufacturer.
Furthermore, California has adopted an equitable in-
demnity rule permitting apportionment of damages among
joint tortfeasors in proportion to their comparative fault." This
rule entitles the plaintiff to full recovery from the manufacturer
while the manufacturer seeks indemnity from the speeding co-
defendant. Therefore, any unfairness inherent in singling out
the manufacturer is diminished.
A similar analysis can be applied to the situation in which
the speeder is the plaintiff suing the manufacturer in negli-
gence. While the negligent act of speeding would constitute
contributory negligence on the part of the speeder, it should
have no bearing in a claim by an innocent bystander plaintiff.,'
40. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468
(1975); Lucas v. City of Long Beach, 60 Cal. App. 3d 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1976);
see also 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2927 (8th ed. 1974); Harper & Kline,
Duty to Control Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
41. Northern Ind. Transit, Inc. v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 89 N.E.2d 905 (1950); New
York Central R.R. v. Cavinder, 14 Ind. App. 42, 211 N.E.2d 502 (1965); Smith v.
Thomas, 126 Ind. App. 59, 130 N.E.2d 85 (1955).
42. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Campo-
donico v. State Auto Parks, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 803, 89 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1970); Young
v. Desert View Management Corp., 275 Cal. App. 2d 294, 79 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1969).
43. Campodonico v. State Auto Parks, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 803, 807, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 270, 273 (1970).
44. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,146
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978), modified, 20 Cal. 3d 892a (1978).
45. "Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff . W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 416-17 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis added), citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 463 (1965).
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Further, even if the speeding driver were to sue the manufac-
turer, and even if the controlling law is that of a comparative
negligence state such as California, the jury will be able to
apportion the blame between the speeder and the manufac-
turer on the basis of relative fault."
The foregoing analysis shows that the issue of product mis-
use can be analyzed alternatively in terms of duty, abnormal
use, or proximate cause. Under any of these approaches, the
bottom line is the same. The manufacturer should be required
to anticipate all uses that are reasonably foreseeable. That the
use is negligent may bar some claims to which the user is a
party. Where a third party sues the manufacturer, however, the
negligent use should not preclude a showing of foreseeability.
Thus foreseeable misuse 7 is within the class of risks to
which the manufacturer's duty of reasonable care extends.
Since duty hinges on foreseeability, the primary issue will be a
question of fact for the jury."8 Before the case can be submitted
to the jury, it must be determined to whom the manufacturer's
duty of reasonable care extends. Fortunately, on this the case
law is well settled. In negligence,'" the plaintiff is not barred
from recovery merely because he is a bystander, rather than a
user or consumer of the product. 50
This section has demonstrated that a manufacturer has a
duty to exercise reasonable care in designing an automobile.
That duty extends to all foreseeable risks, and to all parties
foreseeably endangered by the product. The next inquiry is
whether a manufacturer, by building a car capable of excessive
speed, has breached that duty of reasonable care.
46. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 552 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
47. Similarly, the fact that the defendant lacked actual knowledge of a particular
use does not preclude liability. Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1966), vacated and remanded, 388 U.S. 459 (1967), affg district court and remanding,
390 F.2d 353, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858 (1968).
48. Lagorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Hardman v. Helene
Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Il1. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964).
49. Although a bystander can clearly recover'in negligence, the cases are split
on whether the same is true of strict liability. See text accompanying notes 140-149
infra.
50. Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 19341; Sills v. Massey-
Ferguson, 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d
465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318
Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927); Hopper v. Charles Cooper & Co., 104 N.J.L. 93, 139 A.
19 (1927).
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B. Breach of Duty: Is the Conduct Unreasonable?
Whether a manufacturer has failed to exercise reasonable
care is a question of fact for the jury." It should be noted here
that the court in Schemel did not dispute this proposition. Nor
did it dispute that the evidence had- been sufficient to sustain
a jury finding of unreasonable conduct.2 The Schemel court's
decision not to submit the case to the jury was based, rather,
on the premise that no duty existed with respect to the risk of
excessive speeding.
The classic test for determining whether conduct is unrea-
sonable is that enunciated by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co."3 Under that test, reasonableness
depends on whether the burden of taking needed precautions
is outweighed by the likelihood and the gravity of injury. 4 That
balancing test provides a convenient framework for a jury reso-
lution of the reasonableness question.
If there is a basis for a finding that the manufacturer's
conduct is unreasonable, a jury verdict of manufacturer liabil-
ity will stand. To assess the likelihood and gravity of injury, it
is necessary to take a statistical look at the relationship be-
tween speed and automobile accidents and fatalities. That
analysis, together with the subsequent discussion concerning
the burden of taking precautions, will show there is easily suffi-
cient evidence for a jury finding that designing a car capable
of excessive speed is unreasonable.
Traffic Accidents and Fatalities. In designing a product, a
manufacturer is required to consider the environment in which
the product is to be used." The automobile, in particular, is
designed for an environment in which there is a death every
eleven minutes, and an injury every nineteen seconds." One
51. Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Pike v. Frank
G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); see also Noel,
Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions For Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J.
816, 838 (1962) (whether absence of safety device creates an unreasonable risk is a jury
question).
52. A similar observation is made by Judge Kiley, dissenting in Schemel. 384
F.2d at 806.
53. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
54. Id. at 173. Judge Hand expressed this test in algebraic terms. He represented
the probability of harm by P, the gravity of that harm by L, and the burden of
adequate precautions by B. Applying a probability expectation theory, he concluded
that liability should attach whenever B>PL. Id.
55. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968); Spruill v.
Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
56. See Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802, 806 n.3 (1967) (Kiley,
J., dissenting), citing 16 DE PAUL L. REV. 261, 264 (1966).
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noted commentator has observed that one-fourth to one-third
of all cars are involved at least once in an accident resulting in
either injury or death.57 National Safety Council statistics show
that through 1965, approximately 1.5 million people had been
killed in automobile accidents;" since 1965 the onslaught has
continued unabated."9 It is clear, then, that accidents and fa-
talities are foreseeable consequences of operating an automo-
bile on the highways.
Speeding is also foreseeable. The Commissioner of the Cal-
ifornia Highway Patrol reported in 1974 that seventy percent
of the public violates legally posted speed limits,"' a figure
apparently still rising." Nationwide statistics verify the high
incidence of speeding." Although the national fifty-five mile
per hour speed limit has done much to reduce highway speeds,
substantial non-compliance is evident.13
Until recently, the correlation between highway speeds
and traffic safety had been difficult to determine because the
variables often proved incapable of isolation. However, on Jan-
uary 2, 1974, Congress enacted temporary 4 legislation impos-
ing a nationwide maximum speed limit of fifty-five miles per
hour. 5 The legislation was made permanent a year later. "
57. O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 299, 348 (1963).
58. National Safety Council, Accident Facts 58 (1966), cited in D. NOEL & J.
PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES AND MATERIALS 424 n.4 (1976).
59. Recht & Carraro, Lowest Death Rate Ever, TRAFFIC SAFETY, March, 1976, at
14, 15.
60. Gregory, Reprieve on Slaughter Alley, MOTOR TREND, Aug., 1974, at 96, 100-
01 (quoting Commissioner Walter Pudinsky).
61. The California Highway Patrol reported in April, 1977, that 80% of state
drivers violate posted limits. San Diego Evening Tribune, Apr. 15, 1977, at A-14, col.
1:
62. One study shows in tabular form the percentage of vehicles exceeding various
speeds. See Highway Users Federation, Facts on Vital Issues-The 55 MPH Speed
Limit 1, Table 1 (Nov. 1975); see also Ramifications of the 55 M.P.H. Speed Limit,
INSTITUTE OF TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERS, COMM. 4M-2 BRIEFING BOOK 7 (Nov., 1976)
[hereinafter cited as I.T.E. STUDY].
63. All the data cited in notes 60-62 supra were compiled from experience in-
curred after the 55 m.p.h. speed limit had gone int6 effect.
64. The statute was to expire when the President declared a fuel crisis no longer
existed, or on June 30, 1975, whichever came first. Act of Jan. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
239, § 26, 87 Stat. 1047.
65. The legislation accomplished this result by indirect means. It prohibited the
Transportation Secretary from approving any federal highway grant project in a state
not setting a maximum 55 m.p.h. speed limit. Id. § 2(b). The purpose of the Act was
not to enhance safety, but to conserve fuel. Id. § 2(a).
66. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-643, 88 Stat. 2286 (codified in 23 U.S.C.
§ 154 (Supp. V 1975)). For the legislative history, see [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 8011.
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Studies on the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit have made
it possible to quantify the effect of high speeds on traffic safety.
Since the fifty-five mile per hour limit was imposed, actual
driving speeds have dropped appreciably. One study found
average speed reductions of five to ten miles per hour on most
major roads. 7 Another has shown that the fifty-five mile per
hour speed limit has reduced from fourteen percent to one per-
cent" the number of vehicles exceeding seventy miles per hour
on main rural roads. The general speed reductions are well
documented. 9
During the same period in which vehicle speeds have
dropped, highway accidents have also undergone drastic reduc-
tions. The number of reportable accidents0 on California state
highways fell by approximately 7500, and injuries by 9000, in
1974.1' Reductions were felt for all types of accidents,72 includ-
ing those involving pedestrians and bicyclists." Nationally, the
number of highway injuries in 1974 fell by 190,000.1 Various
state studies consistently showed analgous results."
Even more dramatic than the drop in injuries has been the
remarkable decline in fatalities. Total highway fatalities na-
67. I.T.E. STUDY, supra note 62, at 7.
68. Highway Users Federation, Facts on Vital Issues-The 55 MPH Speed Limit
1 (Nov., 1975). The percentage exceeding 65 m.p.h. dropped from 31% to 5%. Id.
69. See, e.g., T. Borg, Evaluation of the 55 mph Speed Limit, Joint Highway
Research Project JHRP-75-6 (Mar. 26, 1975) (Indiana experience) (summarized in
I.T.E. STUDY, supra note 62, App. A). California officials reported a drop in mean speed
on state highways from 61.5 m.p.h. in 1973, to 55.5 m.p.h. in 1974. California Highway
Patrol, The Effect of Fatalities on Average Speed Reduction (Aug., 1976) (Public
Letter); Agent, Herd, & Rizenbergs, First- Year Effects of the Energy Crisis on Rural
Highway Traffic in Kentucky, Traffic Flow Theory and Applications, TRANSPORTATION
RESEARCH REC. No. 567, at 70-81 (1976). Nationwide the average speed on main rural
roads dropped from 60.3 in 1973 to 55.3 in 1974. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., 55 MPH FAcr BOOK 8 (Dec., 1976) [hereinafter cited as NHTSA FACT BOOK].
70. A reportable accident is defined as one in which either an injury or a fatality
occurred. Cal. Highway Patrol,. 1974: A Year of Accident Change 3 (Sept., 1975)
Ihereinafter cited as CHP Study].
71. Id. at 8, chart 2. The reduction below the expected number was roughly 6500.
Id.
72. Fatalities, injuries, reportable accidents, and property-damage-only acci-
dents were all significantly below the expected totals. Id. at 10-11.
73. For the statistical compilation of bicycle or pedestrian fatalities, injuries, and
reportable accidents for each of the years from 1970 to 1974, for all types of roads, see
id. at 9.
74. NHTSA FACT BOOK, supra note 69, at 18.
75. See, e.g., Borg, supra note 69, Table 21, reprinted in I.T.E. STUDY, supra note
62, App. A; D. Minahan, & D. Golomb, Effects of the Energy Crisis and 55 mph Speed




tionwide dropped from 55,000 in 1973 to 46,000 in 1974,11 the
level at which they remained in 1975.11 California experienced
a huge eighteen and one-half percent fatality reduction since
imposition of the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit. 8 That
reduction represents a savings of over 900 lives.78 Other state
studies reveal similar results. 0
That the drop in speeds coincides chronologically with a
drop in both accidents and fatalities is itself some evidence of
a causal connection between high speeds and traffic hazards.
Other observable statistical phenomena reinforce such a corre-
lation. In the first place, the roads on which the speed reduc-
tions were greatest were also the roads showing the greatest
decline in accidents and fatalities. In Arizona, for example,
almost the entire fatality reduction was experienced on roads
where a speed limit greater than fifty-five miles per hour had
previously been in effect.8 ' California reported that a dispropor-
tionate share of its reductions for all types of acci-
dents-fatalities, injuries, reportable accidents, and property-
damage-only accidents-was allocable to state highways
where speed reductions were greatest." The United States De-
partment of Transportation has determined that rural roads
affected by the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit, while carry-
76. NHTSA FACT BOOK, supra note 69, at 18.
77. Id.; see also AUTOMOTIVE INFORMATION, Aug.-Sept., 1974, at 4; What's Behind
the Drop in Traffic Deaths?, TRAFFIC SAFETY, Nov., 1974, at 13. For an analysis of the
1975 fatality rates, see Recht & Carraro, Lowest Death Rate Ever, TRAFFIC SAFErY,
March, 1976, at 14.
78. CHP Study, supra note 70, at 1.
79. Id.
80. E.g., Burrett, Moghrabi, & Matthias, An Analysis of the Relationships be-
tween Accidents and the 55 MPH Maximum Speed Limit on the Arizona Highway
System (July, 1975) (summarized in I.T.E. STUDY, supra note 62, App. A); Chu &
Nunn, An Analysis of the Decline in California Traffic Fatalities During the Energy
Crisis, 8 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 145 (1976); Carlsen, Effects of the 55 MPH
Speed Limit, Table 3 (June 9, 1975) (inter-agency memo, State of Wisconsin).
81. Burrett, Moghrabi, & Matthias, supra note 80, Table 8, reprinted in I.T.E.
STUDY, supra note 62, App. A.
82. The percentages by which 1974 state highway accidents fell short of the
expected totals can be contrasted with the corresponding percentages for the state as
a whole. In tabular form:
State Highways .All State Roads
Fatalities ...... ............. 29.6 19.1
Injuries ..... ............... 21.5 9.0
Reportable Accidents ..... 22.9 10.2
Property-Damage-Only .... 34.7 11.4
These statistics have been extracted from CHP Study, supra note 70, at 11, chart 4.
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ing only 61.7 percent of the travel, nevertheless had 87.9 per-
cent of the national fatality reduction of 1975 over 1973. :1 The
Institute of Transportation Engineers agrees that fatality re-
ductions have been greatest on those roads for which the reduc-
tion in speeds has been greatest. 4
Secondly, regardless of whether reduced speeds were re-
sponsible for a reduction in accidents, there is strong evidence
they were responsible for a drop in fatalities. As the categoty
of accident becomes progressively more serious, the percentage
reduction becomes greater. 5 In 1974, "fatal injuries decreased
more than severe injuries, severe injuries more than other in-
jury, and injury more than (property-damage only)."'" The
National Safety Council, gathering data from motor vehicle
authorities in eighteen states, found that the ratio of total acci-
dents to total fatalities jumped from 46:1 during the first four
months of 1973, to 52:1 during the same period in 1974.17 The
Council has interpreted this phenomenon to mean that once an
accident occurs, the probability of severe injury or death tends
to increase with an increase in speed."
Notwithstanding such substantial evidence, it is fair to ask
whether the accident and fatality reductions might have re-
sulted from factors other than the drop in speed. Because the
fifty-five mile per hour speed limit was triggered by the energy
crisis," one obvious candidate for such a contributing factor
has been reduced travel.
Vehicle miles dropped substantially in 1974, principally
because the energy crisis "limited fuel availability, increased
gas prices, and increased car pooling.""0 In California mileage
decreased by five billion miles." Nationwide travel dropped
83. NHTSA FACT BOOK, supra note 69, at 7.
84. I.T.E. STUDY, supra note 62, at 5-6.
85. See, e.g., id. at 6 (in 1974, total accidents were down 5%; total fatalities down
17%); see also CHP Study, supra note 70, at 11, chart 4 (on California state highways,
in 1974, fatalities were down 29.6%, and injuries 21.5%; corresponding figures for all
roads statewide were 19.1% and 9.0%).
86. I.T.E. STUDY, supra note 62, at 6.
87. See What's Behind the Drop in Traffic Deaths?, TRAFFIC SAFETY, Nov., 1974,
at 13.
88. Gregory, Reprieve on Slaughter Alley, MOTOR TREND, Aug., 1974, at 98.
89. Act of Jan. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-239, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 1046 (codified in 23
U.S.C. § 154) (Supp. V 1975)).
90. CHP Study, supra note 70, at 12.
91. The mileage for the year had been expected to increase by 5 billion miles,




five percent during the first six months of 1974.92 The national
reductions became gradually smaller as the year progressed,
however, and by 1975, total vehicle miles traveled actually
exceeded those for 1973." In 1976, a further slight increase was
experienced. 4 Thus the reduction in travel was short-lived.
More significantly, both accidents and fatalities decreased
not only as absolute numbers, but also in proportion to vehicle
miles traveled. " In 1974, California's actual fatality rate-the
number of fatalities per 100,000,000 vehicle miles traveled-
was only 1.84, compared with an expected rate of 2.41.1 The
1975 national fatality rate also dropped substantially from
the 1973 level. 7 Therefore only a small fraction of the accident
and fatality reductions can reasonably be attributed to reduced
travel."
A second generally recognized cause of enhanced highway
safety has been more uniform vehicle speeds. Studies show that
when the incidence of substantial deviation from the mean
speed increases, the number of accidents and fatalities also
increases.9 In 1974 uniformity of speed improved signifi-
cantly;'00 this improvement was found to account for approxi-
mately eleven percent of the 1974 California fatality reduc-
tion. ''
There is evidence that reduction of the speed limit played
92. I.T.E. STUDY, supra note 62, at 8. The travel decrease was 8.5% in February,
but only 2.3% in June. Id.
93. NHTSA FACT BOOK, supra note 69, at 7; confirmed in letter from William F.
Scott, NHTSA, to author (Apr. 11, 1977).
94. See San Diego Evening Tribune, Apr. 15, 1977, at A-14, col. 1.
95. I.T.E. STUDY, supra note 62, at 6.
96. CHP Study, supra note 70, at 6, chart 1.
97. NHTSA FACT BooK, supra note 69, at 7.
98. For a summary of the various conclusions experts have reached on this issue,
see text accompanying notes 110-117 infra.
99. Council & Waller, How Will the Energy Crisis Affect Highway Safety?,
TRAFFIC SAFETY, Apr. 1974, at 12, 39; CHP Study, supra note 70, at 15-22 (variation of
5-10 m.p.h. above the mean speed causes such a rapid increase in accident involvement
rates that a logarithmic scale is needed to prepare a visual chart); D. Solomon, Acci-
dents on Main Rural Highways Related to Speed, Driver, and Vehicle (U.S. Dept. of
Commerce Bureau of Public Trends, July 1964), cited approvingly by Smith, Chief of
Traffic Safety Research, Cal. Dept. of Transp., in Letters to the Editor, WESTERNrrE,
Jan., 1977, at 6.
One explanation for this phenomenon is that when speeds are more uniform, the
frequency of passing hazards is reduced. Highway Users Federation, Facts on Vital
Issues-The 55 MPH Speed Limit 2 (Nov., 1975).
100. CHP Study, supra note 70, at 20.
101. Increased uniformity accounted for 97 of the 911 lives saved in California
in 1974. Id. at 1. For the nationwide effects of reduced variance in speeds, see I.T.E.
STUDY, supra note 62, at 6.
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a role in causing the reduction in speed variance. The Califor-
nia Highway Patrol has suggested three reasons for believing
the lower speed limit was at least "influential" in producing
the reduced variance. First, both the speed limit and the vari-
ation dropped substantially during the same time period. Sec-
ond, when speed is reduced, the same percentage distribution
results in a tighter distribution of absolute speeds. Third, it
decreased the speed of drivers who had formerly traveled above
fifty-five without affecting the speed of drivers who had for-
merly traveled at fifty-five or below.'0 2 Thus, whatever portion
of the safety improvement is due directly to improved
uniformity of speeds can arguably be attributed indirectly to
the reduction in speeds.
Other factors such as a reduction in occupancy per vehi-
cle,' 03 a reduction in night driving,' 4 greater use of safety
belts,' 5 proportionately less driving by young drivers whose
accident rates are higher,'"0 yearlong daylight savings time,' 07
and better enforcement of drunk driving laws'08 may have
played a part in the fatality reduction experienced in 1974.
According to National Safety Council statistics, however, the
effects of these factors have been relatively minor. 09
The above statistics provide strong evidence of a correla-
tion between high speeds and traffic accidents and deaths. The
vast majority of expert opinion is now in accord."10 The Na-
tional Safety Council has expressed the view that reduced
102. CHP Study, supra note 70, at 20-21.
103. An occupancy reduction in the midst of an energy crisis may at first seem
surprising. Its cause, however, was a decrease in the proportion of traffic for recrea-
tional purposes, where the average number of occupants per vehicle is typically high.
See What's Behind the Drop in Traffic Deaths?, TRAFFC SAFETY, Nov., 1974, at 12, 14.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. See also INSURANCE INsTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, STATUS REPORT, Dec.
20, 1973, at 3 (predicting effects of energy crisis); Gregory, Reprieve on SlaughterAlley,
MOTOR TREND, Aug., 1974, at 96, 97.
107. CHP Study, supra note 70, at 34.
108. In California, arrests for drunk driving were up 10% during the early months
of 1974, and the number of drunk drivers involved in accidents was down 9%. Gregory,
Reprieve on Slaughter Alley, MOTOR TREND, Aug., 1974, at 96, 100.
109. See What's Behind the Drop in Traffic Deaths?, TRAFFIC SAFETY, Nov., 1974,
at 12, 14 (chart).
110. See, e.g., Council & Waller, How Will the Energy Crisis Affect Highway
Safety?, TRAFFIC SAFErTY, Apr., 1974, at 12, 12; Smith, Chief of Traffic Safety Research,
Cal. Dept. of Transp., in Letters to the Editor, WEsTrERarE, Jan., 1977, at 6; I.T.E.
STUDY, supra note 62, at 5-6 (half the nationwide fatality reduction for the first 6
months of 1974 due to reduced and more uniform speeds), 9 (safety benefits of the 55
m.p.h. limit substantiated, limit should be retained); Burrett, Moghrabi, & Matthias,
supra note 80; Agent, Herd, & Rizenbergs, supra note 69, at 70-81.
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speeds not only reduce braking and reaction time, thereby
helping to avoid accidents, but also reduce the severity of acci-
dents that do occur, thereby eliminating a high number of
fatalities."' The Council has concluded that almost half of the
1974 fatality reduction was attributable to reduced speeds."'
The California Highway Patrol has estimated that the com-
bined effect of reduced speeds and more uniform speeds caused
fatalities on California highways to drop by over twenty-one
percent in 1974."11 Similar views have been expressed repeat-
edly by other transportation authorities, 4 and by political offi-
cials.' 1'
Fairness dictates acknowledgement that not all experts
share a belief in the strong correlation between high speed and
traffic fatalities. The principal dissenters seem to be the Utah
Transportation Department"' and Motor Trend Magazine."7 It
111. See What's Behind the Drop in Traffic Deaths?, TRAFFIC SAFETY, Nov., 1974,
at 12, 13.
112. Id. at 14 (11 of the 24% reduction). But one magazine argued that in 1976
only 2.3% of fatal accidents in California had speed in excess of the legal limit as the
primary collision factor. CAR & DRIVER, May, 1978, at 83, 84. This statistic, of course,
does not reveal the number of cases in which high speed, while not causing the colli-
sions, nonetheless aggravated the injury or caused death.
113. CHP Study, supra note 70, at 43, chart 18. The figure of 21% was obtained
by adding the 6% attributable to more uniform speeds to the 15% attitributable to the
55 m.p.h. speed limit (Fatalities, CHP State Highways).
114. See note 110 supra.
115. President Ford said that the 55 m.p.h. speed limit saves 9,000 lives per year.
Statement of Women Highway Safety Leaders (Feb., 1976), quoted in NHTSA FACT
BOOK, supra note 69, at 9. General Benjamin 0. Davis, the personal representative of
former Transportation Secretary Coleman in matters pertaining to the 55 m.p.h. speed
limit, has said the limit is the best way of saving lives. COMMUNICATOR, July, 1976, at
1, reprinted, in NHTSA FACT BOOK, supra note 69, at 31.
116. Geurts, Safety Studies Engineer, 55 M.P.H., 1692 Witch Hunt in 1976, A
Statistical Analysis of the Effect of the 55 MPH Maximum Speed Limit on Highway
Safety in Utah, WESTERNITE, Jan.-Feb., 1976, at 1, 4-5, reprinted in I.T.E. STUDY, supra
note 62, (where it is labeled "partly incorrect").
117. See, e.g., Gregory, Reprieve on Slaughter Alley, MOTOR TREND, Aug., 1974,
at 96. Other dissenters also contend that the decline in deaths attributed to the 55
m.p.h. speed limit is the result of other factors. First, the NHTSA changed the defini-
tion of auto fatality in 1975. Second, in 1973, 59.35% of vehicle deaths occurred at less
than 55 m.p.h. while the figures for 1974 and 1975 were 66%. It has been argued that
reducing the speed limit had no effect on these accidents. Third, the dissenters main-
tain that the decline in pedestrian deaths, almost all of which occur on surface roads,
cannot be attributed to the new speed limit. Fourth, the use of seat belts has saved
lives. Fifth, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 has resulted in safer cars. Taylor,
Why You Shouldn't Believe The Feds Body Count, CAR & DRIVER, May 1978, at 12.
Using his own assumptions together with NHTSA's own weighting factors, one author
contends that 516 more people died in 1976 after the institution of the 55 m.p.h. speed
limit. Id. at 81. Assuming the 55 m.p.h. speed limit was responsible for reducing
turnpike deaths, that author then claims that the amount of human life saved, in
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
will suffice to note that such opinions exist, and that they
constitute a minority view.
The high probability is that cars will be driven at high
speeds, and that these high speeds will frequently result in
increased accidents and fatalities. The gravity of the human
cost entailed in mass highway deaths is self-evident. The eco-
nomic cost is also devastating. The National Safety Council
figures show the annual economic cost of motor vehicle fatali-
ties to be twenty billion dollars."'
The Burden of Taking Added Precautions. In Schemel,
where the Seventh Circuit rejected high speed capacity as a
design defect, the manufacturer had contended the capacity for
high speed was a deliberate design "to provide 'reserve power'
for passing and to reduce strain on the engine during periods
of sustained operation.""' 9 Certainly a jury could reasonably
find that those purposes do not outweigh the enormous cost
incurred as a result of the thousands of injuries and fatalities
attributable each year to high speeds.
In addition, a jury might reasonably find that the need for
reserve power and reduced engine strain could be met without
creating the capacity for excessive speed. In Schemel, for ex-
ample, the plaintiff had alleged that governors would provide
a simple device for accomplishing such a result.2 9 The require-
ment of expert opinions should be no obstacle to recovery since,
as the dissent noted, "juries have been weighing the opinions
of expert witnesses on all types of issues for years."' 2 '
Other Factors Concerning Breach of Duty. A manufacturer
person-years, was half the amount of time wasted from driving more slowly. CAR &
DRIVER, Sept., 1978, at 12. In the 1973-1974 fuel crisis, all western European countries
adopted speed limits similar to the 55 m.p.h. speed limit in the United States. Ger-
many lifted the limits after the immediate crisis was over, and has set up a system of
recommended speed with no sanction for violation. While death rates are again in-
creasing on turnpikes in speed restricted countries such as France and Belgium, the
turnpike death rate in Germany is steadily decreasing despite no speed limits on the
Autobahn. ROAD & TRACK, Apr.,1978, at 110. The declining death rates are also noted
in ROAD & TRACK, May, 1977, at 136; ROAD & TRACK, June, 1978, at 140. However, those
statistics can prove at most that factors other than a drop in speeds can influence
traffic safety, a position with which this article does not quarrel. They do not disprove
the assertion that high speeds contribute to increased accidents and fatalities.
118. The results of the NSC study are reproduced in Recht & Carraro, Lowest
Death Rate Ever, TRAFRc SAFETY, Mar., 1976, at 14, 17. The $20 billion figure can be
obtained by beginning with the cost of all accidents, $46 billion, and deducting the
costs of public non-motor-vehicle ($4.7 billion), home ($5.6 billion), and work ($15.9
billion). Id.
119. 384 F.2d at 808 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 809.
121. Id. at 810.
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will contend that building a car capable of speeding is merely
following the custom of the automobile industry. At most, how-
ever, compliance with such a norm would constitute some
evidence of reasonable conduct, and would not be conclusive.,"
Therefore the plaintiff need not show deviation from industry
custom to get his case before the jury.2 3 One final consideration
affecting breach of duty is the effect of compliance with federal
safety standards.'24 The enabling statute for the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration expressly provides:
"Compliance with any federal motor vehicle safety standard
issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from
any liability under common law."'2 5 Thus the mere fact that
manufacturer has not violated federal safety standards does
not guarantee non-liability, and at least one court has so
held. '6 Neither compliance with industry custom nor compli-
ance with federal safety standards insulates the manufacturer
from liability.
Summary of the Breach Issue. The evidence discussed in
this section illustrates the foreseeability of speeding, as well as
that of accidents and fatalities. Experience under the fifty-five
mile per hour speed limit reinforces the correlation between
reduced speeds and highway safety in several ways: The reduc-
tion in actual speeds coincides chronologically with the drop in
both accidents and fatalities. The safety improvement has
been greatest on roads where speed reductions have been great-
est. The ratio of fatalities to accidents has dropped apprecia-
bly, reflecting a lesser severity of those accidents which do
occur. The rate of fatalities and accidents per vehicle miles
traveled has also fallen, indicating that the improvement can-
not be attributed solely to the reduced travel brought on by the
energy crisis. Finally, there is reason to believe that reduced
speeds bring with them more uniform speeds, a known ingredi-
ent of highway safety. Not surprisingly, therefore, the weight
of expert opinion is that high speeds are likely to produce a high
incidence of both accidents and fatalities.
122. See Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1976); Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1974); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
123. Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1971).
124. Federal safety standards for automobiles are promulgated by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1391-1426, 1431 (1976).
125. Id. § 1397(c).
126. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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The gravity of the human cost-the loss of life, the perma-
nent injuries, and the trauma-is immeasurable. The economic
cost of accidents and fatalities is also prodigious. The burden
of taking precautions against high speeds would be relatively
slight. The manufacturer need only refrain from designing en-
gines with unnecessary horsepower, or, alternatively, install
governors to control top speed. Such controls are a small price
to pay when it is considered that the purpose of a car is not only
to provide transportation, but also to provide safe transporta-
tion.'27 Further, neither compliance with industry custom nor
compliance with federal standards insulates the manufacturer
from liability. It is concluded that the evidence is sufficient to
warrant a jury finding of unreasonable conduct.
Strict Liability
In addition to a negligence action, the theory of strict lia-
bility should also afford a means of recovery. The starting point
for a discussion of strict liability is section 402A of the Restate-
ment Second of Torts. 402A imposes strict liability on anyone
who sells "any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property," with
other conditions not pertinent here.' 8 The rule applies even
when the seller has exercised all reasonable care in preparing
and selling the product.'
Section 402A requires that a product have a defect and
that it be unreasonably dangerous. The California Supreme
Court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 13 0 continuing its progres-
sive trend in products liability cases,'"' rejected the require-
ment of unreasonable danger and held that a defect proxi-
mately causing injury is sufficient for liability. The Cronin
holding accentuates the importance of defining defect. Al-
though there is no universally accepted definition,' Dean
Wade suggests that a product should ordinarily be considered
defective when "the manufacturer had not intended it to be in
127. Id. at 502.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
129. Id. § 402A(2)(a).
130. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
131. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Vandemark v. Ford Motor Corp., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
132. Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1971); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976).
[Vol. 19
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY
that condition.' 3 3 As he later notes,' 3 however, that definition
makes no sense in a design defect case since the product has
been manufactured as intended. The more logical test for de-
sign defect should therefore be whether the characteristic is
unreasonably dangerous. Thus, in design defect cases, the
terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" should be
treated as synonymous. 3
5
In defining "unreasonably dangerous," two distinct ap-
proaches have been suggested. The Restatement approach de-
fines a product as unreasonably dangerous if it is "dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to its characteristics.'
3
This definition focuses on the expectation of the consumer. Its
application to the manufacturer of a car with high speed capac-
ity would undoubtedly lead to a directed verdict for the defen-
dant, for it would be difficult to argue that the ordinary con-
sumer would not have expected a car to be capable of exceeding
posted speed limits.
The other common approach is the multiple factor test
offered by Dean Wade.' 37 Under this test, the question is
whether a hypothetical manufacturer who knew of the danger
would be acting unreasonably if he were to market the prod-
uct.' 38 Multiple factors, similar to those used in a negligence
action, 3 are suggested as useful in determining the reasonable-
ness.
Whatever the comparative merits of the two tests in cases
where a user or consumer is injured, the Restatement's con-
sumer expectation test makes little sense when applied to the
133. Wade, supra note 30, at 831; see also Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App.
557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951) (no defect found because product was as manufacturer had
intended it to be).
134. Wade, supra note 30, at 832.
135. Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1969); LaGorga v. Kroger Co.,
275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967), affd per curiam, 407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969); Pike
v. Frank G. Hough, Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Wright
v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ToRTs § 402A, Comment i (1965).
137. For an application of the multiple factor test, see Turner v. General Motors
Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
138. Wade, supra note 30, at 834.
139. Many courts and commentators have noted that in design defect cases,
negligence and strict liability theories usually produce the same result. See, e.g., Bal-
ido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973); Engberg
v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973); W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRrs §
96, at 644-45 (4th ed. 1971); Wade, supra note 30, at 841.
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plaintiff who is an unrelated bystander. To see why this is so,
it is necessary to explore the more basic question of whether
the bystander even has a cause of action against the manufac-
turer in strict liability.
Section 402A itself provides for strict liability when the
plaintiff is a user or consumer of the product."10 Thus, in the
early years of strict liability, the courts strained to classify
injured plaintiffs as "users" of products. 4' The Restatement's
reference to users and consumers should not be taken as a
negative pregnant implying bystanders cannot recover in strict
liability, however, for the American Law Institute expressly
declined to offer its view on that issue. 42
Whether bystanders should be able to recover depends on
the underlying theory felt to justify the imposition of strict
liability. Dean Prosser has observed that if the theory is one of
loss-spreading-the idea that the enterprise, by increasing its
prices, should bear the cost of injuries stemming from its prod-
uct-then there is no reason for selectively denying recovery to
bystanders.' However if the theory is that the plaintiff has
relied on safety representations by the manufacturer, then the
bystander, who has relied on nothing, should not be permitted
to recover in strict liability. 4
The first theory is the sounder approach. It was precisely
to escape the contract law limitations of implied warranty that
the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc. '45 adopted a theory of strict liability. Two au-
thors, suggesting that the implied warranty theory should be
available without proof of reliance, have alternatively argued
that if reliance is required, that of the purchaser should be
sufficient since the injury would not have occurred but for the
sale.'
Although the cases are still split on the issue of liability to
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 402A(1) (1965).
141. See, e.g., Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d
185 (1966) (person injured by a falling roof was a "user" of the roof); Haut v. Kleene,
320 I1. App. 273, 50 N.E.2d 855 (1943) (woman who contracted disease while cooking
food for husband was a "user" of the food).
142. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A, Caveat 1; see also id., Comment
1 (1965).
143. Prosser, Products Liability in Perspective, 5 GONZ. L. REV. 157, 169 (1970).
144. Id. at 170.
145. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Dean Prosser, referring
to Greenman, said, "Warranty never had been anything but a rather transparent
device to accomplish strict liability anyway." Prosser, Products Liability in
Perspective, 5 GONZ. L. REV. 157, 163 (1970).
146. L. BRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODuCTs LIABILITY § 16.04(4) (1970).
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bystanders,"' the overwhelming trend is to permit recovery. In
the leading case of Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,'45 a
defective car veered out of control, colliding with a vehicle
driven by the plaintiff. The California Supreme Court held the
injured bystander could recover in strict liability from the
manufacturer of the defective automobile. Many modern deci-
sions are in accord."19
In the remainder of the discussion on strict liability it will
be assumed the plaintiff was injured in a state permitting by-
stander recovery. It is evident that the same rationale which
justifies such a rule dictates that the consumer expectation test
be rejected as a means of determining such liability. That basic
rationale, expressed in Greenman, is that strict liability is an
action in tort, not in contract. 5 ' If an injured bystander sues
the manufacturer in tort, the expectation of the consumer, who
is not a party to the claim, has no logical bearing. The multi-
ple factor test, by contrast, is an appropriate way to resolve the
liability issue, because it is the unreasonably dangerous nature
of the product which gives rise to liability for design defect.
The multiple factor test directly addresses the question
whether a particular characteristic of a product is unreasona-
bly dangerous. Dean Wade has described this inquiry as one of
balancing the risk entailed by the dangerous condition against
the social utility attained by marketing the product in that
fashion. 5'
The California Supreme Court has recently combined both
the Restatement test and the multiple factor test into the fol-
lowing formulation:
[A] product is defective in design 1) if the plaintiff dem-
onstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner, or 2) if the plaintiff
147. For a good compilation of cases in both directions, see Prosser, Products
Liability in Perspective, 5 GONZ. L. REV. 157, 169 n.37 (1970). See also 41 TENN. L.
REV. 756 (1974).
148. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
149. E.g., Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Pike
v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Lenhart
v. Owens, 211 Kan. 534, 507 P.2d 318 (1973); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375
Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622,
345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
150. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
151. Wade, supra note 30, at 825, citing Keeton, Product Liability and the Mean-
ing of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37 (1973).
19791
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
proves that the product's design proximately caused his
injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the
relevant factors . . . that on balance the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design.' 5
Thus the California plaintiff can recover under either theory.
As applied here, the issue then is whether there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a jury finding that the risks involved
in designing a car capable of excessive speed outweigh any
social utility realized. This is precisely the ultimate issue in the
negligence claim, and the answer there has been shown to be
in the affirmative. 3 In conclusion, the strict liability claim,
like the the negligence claim, should withstand a motion to
dismiss, depending on the nature of the auto manufacturer's
defenses.
Assumption of the Risk: A Defense of the Manufacturer
One affirmative defense which the manufacturer may seek
to invoke is assumption of the risk.'54 The theory of this defense
is that the plaintiff has agreed in advance to waive the defen-
dant's duty toward him.' Assumption of risk must be distin-
guished from contributory negligence. The former requires
knowledge of the danger, and intelligent acquiescence; the lat-
ter requires unreasonable conduct.' Jurisdictions which still
recognize the assumption of risk defense with respect to negli-
gence "'57 generally apply it to strict liability as well,'58 a position
152. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239-40 (1978).
153. See subsection entitled Negligence supra.
154. For other possible defenses, see notes 29-39 and accompanying text (abnor-
mal use), 44-46 and accompanying text (contributory and comparative negligence)
supra.
155. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 440 (4th ed. 1971); Noel, supra note
30, at 120.
156. Koshorek v. Pa. R.R. Co., 318 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1963); see also W. PRosSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 441 (4th ed. 1971); Noel, supra note 30, at 106.
157. California has merged assumption of the risk into the general scheme of
liability in proportion to fault. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). For cases abolishing the doctrine, either completely or as
applied in specific contexts, see Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136
(1965); Bolduc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 (1962); McGrath v. American
Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963); Ritter v. Beals, 225 Or. 504, 358 P.2d
1080 (1961); Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
158. E.g., Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1976) (dictum); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 443 (1972) (dictum); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305
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with which the Restatement and California are in accord. 159
Assumption of the risk is a question of fact for the jury.6 0
For the assumption of risk defense to apply, the plaintiff
must "know, understand, and voluntarily incur the risk."'' In
the negligence context the manufacturer would argue that the
plaintiff had known and understood from common experience
that many drivers operate their vehicles at excessive speeds,
and that by entering the public highway the plaintiff had vol-
untarily incurred the risk of collision with such a driver. In-
deed, there is a suggestion in the Schemel dissent that assump-
tion of risk may have been a serious issue in that case. 6 '
The assumption of risk defense should not be successful in
the automobile situation. First, as Dean Prosser points out, a
plaintiff does not assume a risk when the defendant's conduct
has left him no reasonable alternative.'13 In several older cases,
railroads had negligently failed to fence off portions of track,
with the result that cattle grazing on nearby farmland had been
killed by passing trains. The courts held the farmers could not
be required to forego pasturing their cattle because of the rail-
road companies' omissions."' Dean Prosser draws from those
cases the general principle that "the plaintiff is not required to
surrender a valuable legal right, such as the use of his own
property as he sees fit, merely because the defendant's conduct
has threatened him with harm if the right is exercised."'' 5
The same is true of the plaintiff who drives his car on the
public highway. He should not be expected to forego the legal
right to drive his car simply because the manufacturer's con-
duct in building a car capable of dangerous speeds has threat-
ened the exercise of that right.
Second, the assumption of risk defense in this context is
conceptually similar to that in any other case involving auto-
(1970); Batkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968); accord, Noel, supra
note 30, at 107-08.
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Towrs § 402A, Comment n (1965); Luque v.
McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
160. Cox v. Johnston, 139 Col. 376, 339 P.2d 989 (1959); Turner v. Johnson, 333
S.W.2d 749 (Ky. 1960); accord, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 447 (4th ed. 1971);
Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 139 (1961).
161. Noel, supra note 30, at 121.
162. Among the "real issues" identified by the dissent was "whether Schemel
assumed the patent risks of meeting drivers like Bigham on the highway." Schemel v.
General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
163. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 451 (4th ed. 1971).
164. E.g., Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 P. 1020 (1895); North
Bend Lumber Co. v. City of Seattle, 116 Wash. 500, 199 P. 988 (1921).
165. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 451 (4th ed. 1971).
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mobile accidents. If the court were to hold that mere entry onto
the public highway constitutes an assumption of the risk of
meeting speeding drivers, it is hard to conceive of any negligent
highway-related act which could give rise to liability. The logi-
cal consequence would be that the plaintiff would be unable to
recover from the speeding driver, even in an ordinary negli-
gence suit. A plaintiff who has assumed the risk that cars capa-
ble of speeding will be placed on the road has certainly as-
sumed the risk that such cars will actually be operated at those
speeds. Assumption of risk is simply not a viable defense in the
defective automobile case.
Advantages in Maintaining a Cause of Action in Both
Negligence and Strict Liability
The availability of both the negligence and strict liability
causes of action ultimately rests on reasonableness. In negli-
gence the focus is on whether the manufacturer acted unrea-
sonably in marketing the product. In strict liability the ques-
tion ordinarily is whether the manufacturer, if he had known
the product contains a particular characteristic, would have
been acting unreasonably by marketing it anyway.' In the
present context the manufacturer does know that the car he
produces is capable of excessive speed. When he has such
knowledge, it is therefore not surprising that the two claims
ultimately turn on the same basic issue. That being the case,
it might be asked why there would be any advantage in main-
taining both causes of action. Depending on the facts of the
individual case, there are at least three ways in which the out-
comes of the two claims might differ.
First, the strict liability claim can encounter difficulty
when the plaintiff is an unrelated bystander. If injury to him
was reasonably foreseeable, the fact he was not a user or con-
sumer does not bar liability in negligence.' 7 In some jurisdic-
tions, however, it may bar recovery in strict liability.' 8 Thus
the negligence claim would withstand a motion to dismiss in
some cases in which a strict liability claim would not.
Second, defenses to the two claims can vary. Contributory
negligence, clearly at least a partial defense to negligence,' 6 is
166. See Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
167. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
168. See cases cited in Prosser, Products Liability in Perspective, 5 GONZ. L. REv.
157, 169 n.37 (1970).
169. See, e.g., CAL. Cv. CODE § 1714 (West 1973). The word "partial" was in-
serted in the text because many states have adopted the doctrine of comparative
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not ordinarily a defense to strict liability.7 0 For example, if the
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt contributed to his injuries,
a strict liability count might be necessary, depending on the
jurisdiction. '7 In addition, since the advent of comparative
negligence,'" the issue has arisen whether negligence on the
part of the plaintiff will reduce the recovery when the action is
brought on a strict liability theory. 73 California has recently
responded to this issue in the affirmative.' 7
Third, it is possible damages recoverable in strict liability
may vary from those recoverable in negligence. The strict lia-
bility policy of spreading the losses when defective products
cause injuries may militate toward allowing more liberal recov-
ery. On the other hand, strict liability represents a lower degree
of fault than negligence. Focusing on the defendant's conduct
might therefore result in restricting the categories of available
damages. At the present time, case law on damages recoverable
in strict liability actions is still somewhat meager.'
Policy Considerations
It has generally been recognized by highway specialists
that there are three main elements of a traffic safety program:
negligence, under which the damages of a contributorily negligent plaintiff are reduced
proportionately. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d'1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975).
170. That is the overwhelming majority view. See Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d
319 (Alaska 1970); Horn v. General Motors, 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1976); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972);
Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); accord,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). For the minority view, see
Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970) (dictum); Codling
v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Dippel v. Sciano,
37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (dictum).
171. For a case indicating that failure to wear a seat belt constitutes contributory
negligence, see Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967) (dictum);
cf. Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969). For further discus-
sion of the legal effect of failure to wear a seat belt, see Symposium: The Seat Belt
Defense in Practice, 53 MARQuETTE L. REV. 172 (1970); The Emerging Seat Belt De-
fense: Two Views, 5 AKRON L. REV. 129 (1972).
172. See note 169 supra.
173. Cases answering in the affirmative include Butaud v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967). For full treatment of this issue, see Levine, Strict Products Liability
and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. 337 (1977).
174. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978).
175. Among the leading cases are Sealy v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403
P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), and Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
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the driver, the vehicle, and the motoring environment.' 6 With
the publication of Ralph Nader's 1965 expos6 of automobile
safety defects,' the vehicle component increased sharply. Cre-
ating an incentive for manufacturers to prevent lawless speed-
ing would seem to be the next logical step in the progression of
improved safety standards for automobiles.
Liability for production of a car capable of excessive speed
is no more intrusive, on either the manufacturer or the con-
sumer, than many of the existing safety requirements. When
compared with such standards as a seat belt system,7 8 in fact,
it is arguably even less intrusive. Preventing a car from exceed-
ing a particular speed, as long as that speed is at least as high
as the maximum posted limit,' 9 does nothing more than pre-
vent the driver from committing an act which is already crimi-
nally proscribed. In addition, the restriction would be far less
paternalistic. While a seat belt generally protects no one but
the user,' 80 a maximum speed standard would protect other
innocent people.
Legitimate concern might arise about what will happen if
the courts impose liability on manufacturers of excessively fast
cars, for injuries which would not have occurred but for the
speeding capacity. Most likely, there would initially be many
large judgments entered against automobile manufacturers,
and it is plausible to assume that those costs will be passed on
to the consumer. Because the money paid out by the manufac-
turers represents payments which would have been at least
partially borne by the speeding drivers and their insurance
carriers, however, it can be assumed any increase generated in
automobile prices will be offset nationwide by a corresponding
176. Thorpe, Compensation Reform, Accident Costs, and Traffic Safety: Toward
a Unified Motor Transport Policy, 46 IND. L.J. 301, 316 (1971); Tofany, Introduction
to the Motor Vehicle Symposium, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 431, 431 (1971).
177. R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). Congress passed the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966. Act of Sept. 9, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970)).
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 1410b (1976).
179. Schemel was decided in 1967, before imposition of the 55 m.p.h. speed limit.
Even then, however, the highest legal speed was 70 m.p.h. in 44 states, 75 in 3, 80 in
1, and "reasonable and proper speeds" in 2. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d
802, 805 n.2 (7th Cir. 1967) (Kiley, J., dissenting). The G.M. car was proceeding at
115 m.p.h. at the time of the accident. Id. at 803.
180. It is recognized, of course, that even a requirement designed only to protect
the user of a product can indirectly benefit others. Thus an injury resulting from failure
to wear a seat belt can cause emotional and financial hardship to other members of
the family, place an extra strain on the community's medical resources, and boost
insurance rates for everyone.
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decrease in insurance premiums.' 81 Thus the short-term effect
on all parties is negligible: The consumer's total bill for his car
and his insurance premium remain fairly constant; the manu-
facturer's additional costs are offset by the additional price of
the car; and the insurance company's reduced claims permit a
premium structure lower than it would otherwise have been.
The real benefit of imposing liability is long-term. The
existing system has the advantage of allowing recovery from
the deep pocket of the insurance company.' 2 This advantage
will not be lost, for the manufacturer's deep pocket will par-
tially replace that of the insurance company. The difference is
that while both deep pockets have the desire to keep accidents
to a minimum, only the manufacturer has the ability to do so.
He can take action to prevent cars from speeding; the insur-
ance company cannot. It will be to his advantage to stop de-
signing cars capable of excessive speed, and it is thus likely he
will do so. Therefore, in the long run there will no longer be the
question of who is to bear the costs of excessive speeding; there
will simply be no such costs for anyone to bear. Finally, recov-
ery from the manufacturer might be the only recourse of the
innocent bystander plaintiff. The driver of the speeding auto-
mobile might be judgment-proof except for an inadequate lia-
bility insurance policy. A products liability action based on
defective design will be the only reasonable alternative for a
plaintiff placed in such a position.
CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF EXCESSIVE SPEED
In addition to the policy considerations already discussed
with respect to judicial imposition of common law liability,
other factors become important when congressional action in
this area is considered.
An automobile manufacturer provides a needed product
when he markets a car. At the same time, however, he creates
several adverse effects: the exposure of people to safety haz-
ards, the consumption of critically scarce energy resources, and
the pollution of the air. It is reasonable to require that one
whose actions cause such adverse consequences submit to unin-
181. The differences would not be exactly the same because the class of people
paying insurance premiums does not coincide precisely with the class of automobile
buyers.
182. For discussion of the theory of compensation, see generally Thorpe, supra
note 176; cf. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(liability of landlord to tenant for failing to protect against criminal act of third party).
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trusive measures aimed at minimizing the impact of those con-
sequences.
One cost of high speed capacity is the law enforcement
problem it creates. Although the fifty-five mile per hour speed
limit has been highly popular,' serious enforcement problems
exist. The enormous increase in citations'84 has to some extent
diverted highway patrol units from other important functions,
including the policing of county roads on which accident fre-
quency is sometimes higher.'5 Therefore one important cost
reduction in limiting automotive speed capacity is that law
enforcement officials will not have to spend as much of their
time policing violations of speed limit laws.
In addition, public attention has recently focused on the
acuteness of the fuel crisis confronting the United States. As
of January, 1975, the United States was importing thirty-eight
percent of its petroleum needs,' 6 contributing to a fiscal year
1974 trade deficit of five billion dollars.'87 Reliance on foreign
oil also makes American energy needs dependent on the whims
of foreign governments' political policies. Most importantly,
unnecessary consumption of fuel further reduces the world's
finite resources. About fourteen percent of American energy
consumption is traceable to its more than one hundred mil-
lion' 18 registered motor vehicles.' 8 The problem posed by auto-
motive fuel consumption is obviously enormous.
The fifty-five mile per hour speed limit was enacted by
Congress for the express purpose of addressing this energy shor-
tage.10 It was based on the assumption that there was a correla-
tion between high speeds and fuel consumption. Prior to enact-
ment of the fifty-five mile per hour limit, the Federal Highway
183. See notes 194-195 infra.
184. In California the number of daily citations has increased from 1,300 in 1973,
to 3,600 in 1974. Statement of W. Pudinski, Comm'r of Cal. Highway Patrol, reported
in Gregory, Reprieve on Slaughter Alley, MOTOR TREND, Aug., 1974, at 96, 101. Cita-
tions are also up nationwide. I.T.E. STUDY, supra note 62, at 8-9.
185. Release from Cal. Highway Patrol regarding Speed Enforcement 2 (Sept. 26,
1975) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
186. American Auto. Assn., Questions and Answers on Energy and the Automo-
bile 3 (Jan. 15, 1975).
187. Compare to the $5 billion trade surplus in the preceding year. Id.
188. Id. at 1; FED. ENERGY ADMIN., DON'T BE FUELISH. TIPS FOR THE MOTORIST 1.
189. Id.; American Auto. Assn., Questions and Answers on Energy and the Auto-
mobile 1 (Jan. 15, 1975). They consumed 106,832,000,000 gallons of fuel in 1974. Id.
190. Act of Jan. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046, was entitled "An Act
to Conserve Energy on the Nation's Highways." It is to be cited "the Emergency
Highway Energy Conservation Act." Id. § 1. Its express purpose is to conserve fuel by
establishing a national maximum highway speed limit. Id. § 2(a).
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Administration had completed a comprehensive study of the
effects of speed on mileage. Testing a wide variety of cars, it
found that fuel consumption increased dramatically at speeds
above fifty miles per hour, soaring almost out of sight above
seventy miles per hour."'
The results of the fifty-five mile per hour limit bear out
this assumption. The Institute of Transportation Engineers
calculated that reduced speeds saved three billion gallons of
gasoline in 1974. 12 The California Highway Patrol estimated
that if all Californians were to obey the speed limit for one
month, almost twelve million gallons would be saved.'9 ' The
EPA and FEA, in a joint publication, claim that for every ten
miles per hour above fifty, mileage decreases by ten to fifteen
percent.'94 Therefore, by building cars capable of reaching high
speeds, manufacturers aggravate the already high rates of au-
tomobile fuel consumption.
EPA studies reveal that a reduction in the speed limit from
sixty-five miles per hour to fifty-five miles per hour reduces
emissions of nitrogen oxides by sixteen percent.9 5 At the same
time, however, hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions
actually increased slightly.' Thus, the effects of high speeds
on air quality are mixed.9 7
Congressional enactment of the fifty-five mile per hour
speed limit has received wide official acclaim 9 ' and over-
whelming popular support,' with the strongest agreement
191. See Fed. Highway Admin., The Effect of Speed on Automobile Gasoline
Consumption Rates, at 6, Table I (Oct. 1973). Id. at 7, Table II, displays analogous
results for cars with air conditioning.
Another study, Fed. Highway Admin., The Effect of Speed on Truck Fuel Con-
sumption Rates (Aug., 1974), dispelled the myth that large trucks could operate more
efficiently at high speeds. See id. at 9 (noting that at high speeds the wind resistance
lowers mileage appreciably).
192. I.T.E. STUDY, supra note 62, at 8.
193. See Release from Cal. Highway Patrol, supra note 185, at 2.
194. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & FED. ENERGY AD., 1977 GAS
MILEAGE GUIDE 26 (Sept., 1976).
195. Information contained in letter from Fred Baumberger, Information Officer,
Cal. Air Resources Bd. Lab., El Monte, Cal., to author (Feb. 25, 1977).
196. Hydrocarbons increased 5% and carbon monoxide 4.7%. Id.
197. For a detailed analysis, see Cal. Air Resources Bd., Project M-220, Effect
of Speed on Emissions (Mar., 1971).
198. See note 115 supra (comments of President Ford and General Davis).
199. A 1976 Georgia poll revealed that 74% of the 866 drivers surveyed favor
retention of the 55 m.p.h. speed limit "because it saves lives." Georgia Survey Shows
Solid 55 MPH Support, COMMUNICATOR, July, 1976, at 1, reprinted in NHTSA FACT
BOOK, supra note 69 at 8. For all reasons combined, 84% of the motorists surveyed
favored retention. Id.
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being that it has saved lives."' It is feasible to expect that other
lifesaving provisions would be welcomed with equal enthusi-
asm once the beneficial effects are felt.
Congress could set a maximum speed potential for cars
manufactured after a specified date. Such a statute could be
enacted either independently or as an amendment to the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966."1 The
purpose of the latter statute is "to reduce traffic accidents and
deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic acci-
dents." 02 Given the substantial correlation between reduced
speeds and highway safety, 03 regulating maximum speed po-
tentials within the 1966 Act would be a natural way in which
to fulfill that goal.
If Congress is unwilling to enact permanent legislation, it
could enact temporary legislation, as was done with the fifty-
five mile per hour speed limit, 04 observe the results, and make
the legislation permanent once it proves successful. 0 5 Congress
could make maximum speed potentials applicable to one or
two new model years, observe the accident rates for the new
cars, and then decide whether to make the legislation perma-
nent.
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966,06 the Secretary of Transportation is required to
promulgate federal motor vehicle safety standards. 07 The stat-
ute defines "motor vehicle safety" as protection of the public
against "unreasonable risk of accidents occurring as a result of
the design, construction, or performance of motor vehicles."108
200. See note 199 supra.
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970).
202. Id. § 1381.
203. See subsection entitled Traffic Accidents and Fatalities supra.
204. Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-239,
§ 2(e), 87 Stat. 1046.
205. 23 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. V 1975).
206. That is the official name. Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 101, 80 Stat. 718 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970)).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) refers to the "Secretary." The "Secretary," in turn, is
defined as the Secretary of Transportation. 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970). The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration can and should promulgate regulations impos-
ing a maximum speed limit potential on new cars. It might additionally be argued that
the Federal Energy Administration, or even the Environmental Protection Agency,
could regulate in this manner, for high speeds also affect energy consumption and air
pollution. See text accompanying notes 126-138 supra.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (1970).
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The standards actually set "shall be practicable, shall meet the
need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective
terms.'"' In prescribing standards, the Secretary is required to
consider "the extent to which such standards will contribute to
carrying out the purposes" of the statute.t 0 The Secretary of
Transportation has in turn delegated to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administrator the authority provided by the
1966 Act."'
These statutory guidelines arguably authorize the Admin-
istrator to order manufacturers to limit the maximum speed of
new cars to a specified level. As was detailed earlier, building
cars capable of excessive speed exposes the public to an unrea-
sonable risk of accidents, precisely the risk which the safety
standards are statutorily intended to confront.' Because limit-
ing top speed is practicable,"' and because the order setting
such a limitation could easily be stated in objective terms,
there seems to be no barrier to an order limiting the maximum
speed potential of new cars."t
In fact, regulations have been adopted"1 5 limiting indicated
speed on new car speedometers to a maximum eighty-five miles
per hour. The purpose of the regulation was stated in the notice
of proposed rulemaking:11
This proposed standard for reduced maximum speedome-
ter indication has been initiated to help maintain these
lower speeds at minimum costs.
Benefits are expected to be achieved by the proposed
standard in several ways. First, whatever temptation pres-
ent speedometers provide immature drivers to test the top
speed of their vehicles will be diminished. Second, shifting
the indication for 50 or 60 mph from the center of the
speedometer dial nearer to the right end should suggest to
drivers that these speeds are near the legal limit. Existing
speedometers which indicate speeds of 120 mph or more
209. Id. § 1392(a).
210. Id. § 1392(f)(4).
211. 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(a) (1976); id. § 501.2(a). Similar authority has been dele-
gated with respect to the Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C. ch. 4 (Supp. V 1975).
See 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(b) (1976).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (1970).
213. See section entitled Imposition of Common Law Liability by the Courts
supra, which shows that the burden of taking precautions to guard against excessive
speeding would be slight in relation to the harm of not taking such precautions.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1970).
215. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,919, 10,920-21 (1978) (to be codified in 49 C.F.R. § 571.127).
216. 41 Fed. Reg. 54,204 (1976).
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use more than half of the dial to indicate illegal and dan-
gerous speeds.
Finally, limiting the maximum indication to 85 mph
will allow speedometer dials to be more precisely gradu-
ated and more readable in the range of speeds normally
driven. The NHTSA regards 85 mph as an appropriate
maximum indication, since a much higher figure would
defeat the desired effect of the rule. 17
Adoption of this rule indicates the agency's awareness of the
problem.
Finally, the extent to which maximum speed capacity
standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes of the
statute must be considered."' Since the expressed legislative
purpose was "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and inju-
ries to persons resulting from traffic accidents,"2 '9 and since a
high correlation exists between reduced speeds and highway
safety,29 an administrative order limiting top speed of new cars
would contribute greatly toward the legislative purpose.
Such a regulation would be less intrusive than many exist-
ing safety standards, which impose such requirements as a
windshield washing system' and detailed specifications as to
impact protection for all occupants.2 Other existing regula-
tions often do nothing more than protect the driver against his
own willingness to risk harm to himself. Examples include the
requirements of a seat belt warn'ing system, "3 and of a theft
control key-locking system with a warning buzzer to be acti-
vated whenever the key is left in the ignition.2 4 Compared to
these requirements, prohibiting a car from injuring others by
traveling at an already lawless speed is a mild way in which to
reduce accidents and fatalities.
CONCERNS ABOUT THE APPROPRIATE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT TO
ACT
The desirability of imposing liability for speeding injuries
217. Id.
218. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(4) (1970).
219. Id. § 1381.
220. See section entitled Imposition of Common Law Liability by the Courts
supra.
221. 49 C.F.R. § 571.104-S4.2 (1976).
222. The specifications for the impact protection system generally appear at id.
§ 571.201. Other specifications pertain to the head restraint system, id. § 571.202, and
protection of the driver from the steering wheel, id. § 571.203.
223. Id. § 571.208.S7.3.
224. Id. § 571.114.S4.4.
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on manufacturers of unnecessarily fast cars has been demon-
strated. It has also been shown that such liability could alter-
natively be imposed by the courts, by Congress, or by the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Several consid-
erations arise in determining which of the three alternatives
would be best.
One clear concern is that the liability issue is so intimately
related to basic policy that the decision should be made only
by a legislative body. The court in Schemel seemed uneasy
about making such an important decision, quoting approvingly
the district court's opinion that the problem of devising safety
standards is a legislative one.12
The Schemel court's philosophy about the judicial role is
understandable. Being popularly elected, Congress is probably
the best authority for making what might be regarded as a
value judgment on policy-whether the human and economic
,costs of traffic accidents outweigh whatever benefits powerful
engines and the absence of governors are intended to confer.
Yet the courts have always been called upon to make important
policy decisions, and when the issue is one of finding simple
negligence or even strict liability, the fact that the issue is an
important one does not make assertion of judicial authority any
less legitimate. It would seem that while policymaking can be
most ideally effected by Congress, the courts too can properly
act in this area.
In addition, a judicial decision for the defendant is every
bit as much a policy decision as one for the plaintiff. When an
injury occurs, someone must incur the cost. A decision by a
court not to submit the case to the jury is in essence a judicial
declaration that as between the injured bystander and the
manufacturer, the former should bear the expense. Therefore
the question is not whether a court should make a policy deci-
sion, but rather which of several policy alternatives it should
select.
A second consideration is that of relative expertise. The
administrative agency charged with traffic safety would ob-
viously have the greatest technical expertise on this subject.
However courts have always resolved issues of the reasonable-
ness of conduct: when a subject is beyond the technical grasp
of a lay trier of fact, expert witnesses provide the necessary
information.
225. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1967).
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One court, expressing reluctance to impose liability in de-
sign defect cases, noted the possibility of a third problem; in-
consistent judgments." Two types of inconsistencies are possi-
ble. One is that some courts (and juries) might permit recovery,
while others deny it. The second is that those courts permitting
recovery might differ as to the maximum allowable speed po-
tential consistent with reasonableness. In either case, the man-
ufacturer could protect himself by complying with the most
restrictive of the holdings.
A final concern involves the timing of decision making. On
the one hand, there is a need to act promptly so that compensa-
tion will not be prevented and deterrent effect lost. On the
other hand, it is desirable that the defendant manufacturer
receive fair warning of the potential for liability. While a court
can give prompt relief by acting directly on the parties before
it, the first such cases may catch the manufacturer by surprise
if the decisions are made retroactive." 7 This result is not neces-
sarily unfair. The manufacturer does have warning that an
unreasonably dangerous design could culminate in liability.
That he does not know in advance whether the jury would find
his design unreasonable is no truer here than in any other de-
sign defect case, or, for that matter, in any ordinary negligence
case.
By contrast, if Congress sets a maximum speed capacity,
it could easily limit the legislation to cars manufactured in the
future. Even as to those cars, the hearings and committee re-
ports implicit in the legislative process, while prolonging the
procedure, would give the automobile industry time to prepare
for compliance. The same is true of an NHTSA regulation, for
advance notice of 180 days to one year is required, absent good
cause.2 In addition the protective rulemaking procedure of the
Administrative Procedure Act has been made expressly applic-
able. ' Thus either legislative or administrative action would
afford substantial protection to the manufacturer without im-
pairing the need for swift relief.
226. Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970).
227. The issue of whether and when judicial decisions can be made prospective
only is beyond the scope of the paper. See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-CASES-
TEXT-PROBLEMS 549-63 (1973).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(c) (1970). The 180-day requirement also applies to
orders revoking regulations. Id. § 1392(e).




The costs of high automobile speeds include an increased
number of highway deaths and disabling injuries, wasteful con-
sumption of precious fuel resources, and added air pollution.
Manufacturing cars capable of lawless speeds permits these
harmful effects without serving any useful social function. It is
difficult to understand why the law allows such a practice to
continue.
Imposition of common law liability fits nicely into existing
tort law. There is little doubt that an automobile travelling on
public highways in excess of one hundred miles per hour poses
a danger to others travelling at lawful speeds. Each moment of
hesitation causes a heavy toll of death and injury. If the courts
fail to apply common law sanctions, either the legislative or
executive branch must act.
One might try to imagine what the popular and the judi-
cial reactions would be if a new product were to contain a
feature which caused these effects, and which conferred no
offsetting "benefits" other than to render the product capable
of being used in a criminally irresponsible manner. In such a
case the reaction would undoubtedly be one of immediate and
uniform condemnation. The time has come to apply the same
standard to the manufacturer of motor vehicles.
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